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Chapter 3: NIST PQC Standards

3.1 Overview of Finalized Standards

NIST finalized the first three Post-Quantum Cryptography standards in August 2024 after an eight-year standardization process. These represent the mandatory baseline for quantum-safe cryptography in U.S. government systems and are being adopted globally.

The Four Published NIST PQC Standards

  • FIPS 203 (August 2024): ML-KEM — Module-Lattice Key Encapsulation Mechanism

  • FIPS 204 (August 2024): ML-DSA — Module-Lattice Digital Signature Algorithm

  • FIPS 205 (August 2024): SLH-DSA — Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Algorithm

  • HQC (March 2025): Code-based KEM — 5th algorithm, draft standard pending

A draft standard for FIPS 206 (FN-DSA, based on FALCON) is expected in 2025–2026.

3.2 FIPS 203: ML-KEM

3.2.1 Specification Summary

FIPS 203 standardizes ML-KEM, derived from CRYSTALS-Kyber. Key design choices:

  • Module dimension \(k \in \{2, 3, 4\}\) (for ML-KEM-512/768/1024).

  • Ring \(R_q = \mathbb{Z}_{3329}[X]/(X^{256}+1)\); \(q = 3329\) chosen for efficient NTT.

  • Uses Kyber.CPA-PKE as an internal primitive, then applies the Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) transform to achieve IND-CCA2 security.

  • Key derivation uses SHAKE-256 (XOF) and SHA3-512 throughout.

  • Encapsulation key (public key) and decapsulation key (private key) renamed from Kyber conventions.

3.2.2 Changes from Kyber to ML-KEM

FIPS 203 introduced several changes from the CRYSTALS-Kyber Round 3 submission:

Table 3.1. Kyber Round 3 vs FIPS 203 ML-KEM Differences
Aspect Kyber (R3) ML-KEM (FIPS 203)
Terminology pk, sk, ct ek (encaps key), dk (decaps key), c
Algorithm names Kyber-512/768/1024 ML-KEM-512/768/1024
Domain separation Less explicit Explicit domain separation added
Implicit rejection Randomized Deterministic (security fix)
Decaps check Conditional re-encryption Always re-encrypt (side-channel fix)

3.2.3 ML-KEM Full Specification

Table 3.2. FIPS 203 ML-KEM Complete Parameter Table
Parameter ML-KEM-512 ML-KEM-768 ML-KEM-1024
NIST Security Level 1 3 5
Module dimension \(k\) 2 3 4
Modulus \(q\) 3329 3329 3329
Polynomial degree \(n\) 256 256 256
CBD parameter \(\eta_1\) 3 2 2
CBD parameter \(\eta_2\) 2 2 2
Compression \(d_u\) 10 10 11
Compression \(d_v\) 4 4 5
Encapsulation key (B) 800 1184 1568
Decapsulation key (B) 1632 2400 3168
Ciphertext (B) 768 1088 1568
Shared secret (B) 32 32 32
Security (classical bits) \(\approx\)118 \(\approx\)180 \(\approx\)247
Security (quantum bits) \(\approx\)107 \(\approx\)164 \(\approx\)226

3.3 FIPS 204: ML-DSA

3.3.1 Specification Summary

FIPS 204 standardizes ML-DSA (based on CRYSTALS-Dilithium), a Fiat-Shamir signature scheme with rejection sampling to prevent secret leakage.

Key design choices:

  • Modulus \(q = 8380417 = 2^{23} - 2^{13} + 1\) (NTT-friendly prime).

  • Polynomial degree \(n = 256\), supporting efficient NTT.

  • Rejection sampling ensures signatures reveal no information about the secret key.

  • Message hashing via SHAKE-256; deterministic signing by default in FIPS 204.

  • Three variants: ML-DSA-44 (Level 2), ML-DSA-65 (Level 3), ML-DSA-87 (Level 5).

3.3.2 ML-DSA Full Parameter Table

Table 3.3. FIPS 204 ML-DSA Complete Parameters
Parameter ML-DSA-44 ML-DSA-65 ML-DSA-87
NIST Security Level 2 3 5
\((k, l)\) \((4, 4)\) \((6, 5)\) \((8, 7)\)
Modulus \(q\) 8380417 8380417 8380417
\(\gamma_1\) \(2^{17}\) \(2^{19}\) \(2^{19}\)
\(\gamma_2 = (q-1)/\alpha\) \((q-1)/88\) \((q-1)/32\) \((q-1)/32\)
\(\tau\) (challenge weight) 39 49 60
\(\beta = \tau \cdot \eta\) 78 196 120
\(\omega\) (max hints) 80 55 75
Verification key (B) 1312 1952 2592
Signing key (B) 2528 4000 4864
Signature (B) 2420 3309 4627
Security (classical bits) \(\approx\)122 \(\approx\)178 \(\approx\)247

3.4 FIPS 205: SLH-DSA

3.4.1 Specification Summary

FIPS 205 standardizes SLH-DSA, based on SPHINCS+. It is a stateless hash-based signature scheme — the most conservative of the three, relying only on hash function security.

3.4.2 SLH-DSA Full Parameter Sets

Table 3.4. FIPS 205 SLH-DSA All 12 Parameter Sets
Variant Level \(n\) pk (B) sk (B) sig (B)
SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s 1 16 32 64 7856
SLH-DSA-SHA2-128f 1 16 32 64 17088
SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s 1 16 32 64 7856
SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128f 1 16 32 64 17088
SLH-DSA-SHA2-192s 3 24 48 96 16224
SLH-DSA-SHA2-192f 3 24 48 96 35664
SLH-DSA-SHAKE-192s 3 24 48 96 16224
SLH-DSA-SHAKE-192f 3 24 48 96 35664
SLH-DSA-SHA2-256s 5 32 64 128 29792
SLH-DSA-SHA2-256f 5 32 64 128 49856
SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s 5 32 64 128 29792
SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256f 5 32 64 128 49856

The “-SHA2” variants use SHA-256/SHA-512; “-SHAKE” variants use SHAKE-128/SHAKE-256.

3.5 HQC: The Fifth PQC Standard

NIST selected HQC (Hamming Quasi-Cyclic) in March 2025 as the fifth PQC algorithm and the second KEM standard. HQC provides:

  • Diversity: Backup to lattice-based ML-KEM, based on code-based hard problems (not lattices).

  • Different mathematical foundation: If a breakthrough attack on MLWE is found, HQC remains secure.

  • Moderate key sizes: \(\sim\)2–7 KB public keys (much more practical than Classic McEliece’s 1.3 MB).

A draft FIPS for HQC is expected in 2025–2026.

3.6 NIST IR 8547: Transition Timeline

NIST Internal Report 8547 specifies the timeline for deprecated classical algorithms:

Table 3.5. NIST IR 8547 Algorithm Transition Timeline
Algorithm Current Use Deprecated Disallowed
RSA (all key sizes) Key exchange, signatures 2030 2035
ECDH (all curves) Key exchange 2030 2035
ECDSA (all curves) Digital signatures 2030 2035
DH (classic) Key exchange 2030 2035
DSA Digital signatures 2023 (already) 2030
ECDH P-256 TLS key exchange 2030 2035
ECDSA P-384 Certificate signing 2030 2035
AES-128 Symmetric encryption Not deprecated Retain w/ PQC
SHA-256 Hashing Not deprecated Retain

Action Required Before 2030

Systems using RSA, ECDH, ECDSA, or DH must migrate to NIST PQC standards (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA) before 2030. For systems with long-lived keys or sensitive data, migration should begin immediately due to the HNDL threat.

3.7 NSA CNSA 2.0 Requirements

The NSA’s Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0 (CNSA 2.0, September 2022) mandates PQC for National Security Systems (NSS):

Table 3.6. NSA CNSA 2.0 Algorithm Requirements
Function Algorithm Parameters Timeline
Key Establishment ML-KEM ML-KEM-1024 (Level 5) Ready now
Digital Signature ML-DSA ML-DSA-87 (Level 5) Ready now
Digital Signature SLH-DSA SLH-DSA-SHA2-256s Ready now
Symmetric Encryption AES AES-256 Ready now
Hashing SHA-3 SHA-384 or SHA-512 Ready now

CNSA 2.0 Timeline for NSS

  • 2025: PQC software deployed and ready; begin use where possible.

  • 2026: PQC used in all new NSS; no new classical-only deployments.

  • 2030: Classical algorithms deprecated from NSS.

  • 2033: All NSS fully migrated to PQC; classical algorithms removed.

3.8 NIST Additional Signatures Round 2 (2023–Present)

After selecting the primary standards, NIST launched a separate process to standardize additional signature schemes, specifically seeking:

  • Diversity from lattice-based schemes (preferring non-lattice approaches).

  • Shorter signatures (addressing SLH-DSA’s large signature sizes).

Table 3.7. NIST Round 2 Additional Signature Candidates (2023)
Scheme Family Notes pk + sig (B)
MAYO Multivariate (UOV) Small pk and sig; promising 1168 + 321
SNOVA Multivariate Very small; efficient 1157 + 69
QR-UOV Multivariate UOV over quotient rings 55K + 264
UOV Multivariate Conservative; large pk 278K + 96
FAEST MPC-in-the-head Hash-based; larger sig 4.4K + 5.6K
SQIsign Isogeny Tiny keys; very slow 64 + 177
MiRitH MPC-in-the-head Fast verify; medium sig 128 + 3K
MIRA Rank-code based New family 96 + 346
RYDE Rank-code based Based on LRPC codes 133 + 2K
Wave Code-based Hash-and-sign; large pk 3.6M + 822
HAWK Lattice (NTRU) Compact; no Gaussian sampler 1024 + 555
EagleSign Lattice NTRU-based variant 1312 + 666

3.9 FIPS 140-3 and Algorithm Compliance

FIPS 140-3 is the U.S. government standard for cryptographic module validation (CMVP — Cryptographic Module Validation Program):

  • All FIPS-approved modules must use only FIPS 140-3 approved algorithms.

  • ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA are FIPS 140-3 approved as of 2024–2025.

  • Cryptographic modules must be validated by NIST-accredited labs (cost: $50K–$500K, timeline: 12–24 months).

  • Security Level 1–4 validation, with Level 2/3 requiring physical security.

CMVP Status 2025

As of early 2025, several implementations of ML-KEM and ML-DSA have undergone or are undergoing FIPS 140-3 CMVP validation. Key vendors: AWS (AWS-LC), Microsoft (SymCrypt), Botan, wolfSSL, OpenSSL (via providers). Check NIST’s CMVP module search at csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program.

3.10 International Standards Alignment

Table 3.8. International PQC Standards Alignment
Body Standards / Activity Status
NIST (USA) FIPS 203/204/205; HQC selection Finalized 2024–2025
ETSI (Europe) TS 103 744 PQC guidance Published
ISO/IEC ISO 18033 (encryption), 14888 (signatures) Revisions in progress
IETF RFC drafts for ML-KEM, ML-DSA in TLS 1.3 Active drafts 2024–2025
BSI (Germany) Technical Guidelines TR-02102-1 Updated for PQC
ANSSI (France) PQC recommendations aligned with NIST Published
CRYPTREC (Japan) Cryptography Research and Evaluation Monitoring NIST output
KPQC (Korea) Indigenous algorithm competition HAETAE, NTRUplus, Peregrine

3.11 Summary

  • FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA), and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA) are the three finalized NIST PQC standards as of August 2024.

  • HQC was selected in March 2025 as the fifth algorithm, adding code-based algorithmic diversity.

  • NIST IR 8547 mandates deprecation of RSA, ECDH, ECDSA by 2030 and disallowance by 2035.

  • NSA CNSA 2.0 requires ML-KEM-1024 and ML-DSA-87 (Level 5) for classified systems with earlier deadlines.

  • FN-DSA (FALCON) is expected in FIPS 206 for applications requiring compact signatures.

  • 14 additional signature candidates are under evaluation; MAYO and SNOVA are among the most promising.