Skip to content

Chapter 37: Confidential Computing Hardware

Note: Confidential Computing isolates data in use using hardware-enforced Trusted Execution Environments at the VM or container level. Unlike process-level TEEs (Chapter 4), full-VM confidential computing protects against a malicious hypervisor, cloud operator, or firmware.

Confidential Computing (CC) is the fastest-growing area of hardware security, driven by the need to process sensitive workloads in untrusted cloud environments. The Confidential Computing Consortium (CCC), a Linux Foundation project, unifies the ecosystem across Intel TDX, AMD SEV-SNP, ARM CCA, and IBM Secure Execution.

37.1 Threat Model: The Untrusted Hypervisor

Traditional cloud security assumes the hypervisor (VMM) is trusted. Confidential Computing removes this assumption. The Trusted Computing Base (TCB) is reduced to:

  • The CPU die (microcode + on-chip encryption engine)

  • The guest firmware (measured and attested)

  • The guest OS and application (running inside the protected VM)

Everything outside is untrusted: the hypervisor, BIOS/UEFI host firmware, device drivers, co-tenants, and cloud operator personnel.

Confidential Computing trust model: hardware enforces isolation even against the hypervisor.
Figure 37.1. Confidential Computing trust model: hardware enforces isolation even against the hypervisor.

37.2 Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX)

Intel TDX, introduced in 4th Gen Xeon Scalable (Sapphire Rapids, 2023), creates hardware-isolated Trust Domains (TDs). The key components are:

37.2.1 TDX Architecture

SEAM Module
A special Intel-signed module that runs in SEAM mode, managing TDs. It acts as the Trust Domain Module (TDM). The SEAM module is measured and its hash is stored in a CPU fuse.
Memory Tagging
Each TD gets a unique private KeyID. Physical memory encrypted with the TD’s key is tagged; the CPU’s Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption (MKTME) engine handles transparent AES-XTS-128 or AES-XTS-256 encryption at the memory controller.
TDCS/TDVPS
TD Control Structure and TD Virtual Processor State are stored in encrypted memory. The hypervisor can read the encrypted blob but not the plaintext state.
TDCALL/SEAMCALL
New instructions allow the TD to call the SEAM module (for attestation, key sealing) and the VMM to manage TDs (create, destroy, page-in/out).

37.2.2 TDX Attestation

TDX remote attestation uses the DCAP (Data Center Attestation Primitives) flow:

  1. The TD requests a TD Quote via TDCALL[TDG.MR.REPORT]

  2. The Quote Service (running outside the TD) signs the report using an ECDSA-P256 key bound to the Intel Provisioning Certification Key (PCK)

  3. A remote verifier checks the Quote against Intel’s PCCS (Provisioning Certification Caching Service)

  4. Measurement Registers: MRTD (TD initial state), RTMR[0-3] (runtime measurements, analogous to PCRs)

#include <tdx_attest.h>

tdx_report_data_t report_data = {0};
/* Embed nonce/public key hash into report_data */
memcpy(report_data.d, nonce, 64);

tdx_report_t td_report;
tdx_get_report(&report_data, &td_report);

/* Send td_report to Quote Generation Service (QGS) */
tdx_quote_t *quote = NULL;
tdx_get_quote(&report_data, &quote, &quote_size);
/* Transmit quote to remote verifier */

37.2.3 TDX 1.5 Improvements (2024)

Intel TDX 1.5, shipping in Intel Xeon 5th Gen (Emerald Rapids) and available via firmware update on Sapphire Rapids, adds:

  • TD Partitioning: Single TD can host multiple isolated partitions

  • Migtd: TD Migration support for live migration of confidential VMs between servers without exposing secrets

  • Nested TDX: A TD can host its own hypervisor (L2 guest TDs)

  • TDX Connect: Direct Memory Access (DMA) to confidential peripherals via SPDM/TDX device attestation

37.3 AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization – Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP)

AMD SEV-SNP (shipped in EPYC 7003 “Milan” 2021, EPYC 9004 “Genoa” 2023) is AMD’s full-VM confidential computing solution. It extends SEV-ES with memory integrity protection.

37.3.1 SEV-SNP Architecture

AES-128-XEX Memory Encryption
Each VM gets a VM Encryption Key (VEK) managed by the AMD Secure Processor (AMD-SP, formerly PSP). Physical pages are encrypted with AES-128 in XEX mode using the guest’s VEK.
Reverse Map Table (RMP)
A hardware-managed table that records which VM “owns” each physical page. If the hypervisor tries to map a page to a different VM, the CPU generates a #PF fault — preventing host-to-guest data injection.
Virtual Machine Privilege Level (VMPL)
SEV-SNP introduces 4 privilege levels (VMPL0–3) within a VM. VMPL0 (e.g., a security monitor) can enforce policies on VMPL1 (the OS) and VMPL2–3 (applications), enabling nested security boundaries without full TEE overhead.

37.3.2 SEV-SNP Attestation

#include <linux/sev-guest.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>

int fd = open("/dev/sev-guest", O_RDWR);

struct snp_report_req req = {
    .msg_version = 1,
};
/* Embed 64-byte user_data (nonce / public key hash) */
memcpy(req.user_data, nonce, 64);

struct snp_report_resp resp;
struct snp_guest_request_ioctl data = {
    .req_data  = (__u64)&req,
    .resp_data = (__u64)&resp,
};
ioctl(fd, SNP_GET_REPORT, &data);
/* resp.data contains the signed SNP attestation report */

Key fields in the SNP Attestation Report:

  • MEASUREMENT: SHA-384 of the initial guest image

  • HOST_DATA: Set by the hypervisor; VM can verify untampered

  • ID_KEY_DIGEST / AUTHOR_KEY_DIGEST: VM identity

  • Signed with VCEK (Versioned Chip Endorsement Key) derived from the AMD root key fused in silicon

37.3.3 SEV-SNP Attacks and Mitigations

Attack Mechanism Mitigation
CacheWarp (2023) AMD SEV(-ES/-SNP): exploit write-back cache to revert encrypted memory to stale state Microcode patch AMD-SB-3005; EPYC 4th Gen unaffected
WeSee (2024) #VC exception handler manipulation in SEV-SNP guests Kernel patch; use VMPL0 security monitor
INCEPTION (2023) Speculative execution RAS poisoning, AMD Zen 3/4 Microcode + kernel IBPB barrier

37.4 ARM Confidential Compute Architecture (CCA)

ARM CCA, introduced in ARMv9.2-A, creates hardware-isolated Realms managed by a new software layer called the Realm Management Monitor (RMM), running at EL2 (Root world). The architecture adds a fourth security state: Root.

37.4.1 CCA World Model

ARM CCA four-world model: Root world manages Realm isolation from the Normal world hypervisor.
Figure 37.2. ARM CCA four-world model: Root world manages Realm isolation from the Normal world hypervisor.

37.4.2 CCA Key Components

Realm Management Extension (RME)
Hardware extension providing the Root world and memory granule protection tables (GPT). GPT assigns each 4KB/2MB/1GB memory granule to a world; unauthorized access causes a granule protection fault.
Realm Management Monitor (RMM)
Open-source firmware layer (TF-RMM, Trusted Firmware project) managing Realm creation, destruction, and attestation.
CCA Attestation

Uses the RATS (RFC 9334) framework:

  • Realm Initial Measurement (RIM): hash of Realm image at creation

  • Realm Extensible Measurements (REM[0-3]): runtime measurements

  • Signed by a hardware-rooted CPAK (Composite Platform Attestation Key)

Note: ARM CCA is available in Cortex-A720 and Cortex-X4 (2024) and integrated in Qualcomm Snapdragon 8 Gen 3. iOS 17 uses hardware-backed security features derived from CCA on Apple Silicon (Apple implements a proprietary variant).

37.5 IBM Secure Execution for Linux (IBM Z / LinuxONE)

IBM Secure Execution (IBM z15/z16, LinuxONE III/IV) isolates KVM guests using hardware memory encryption. The Ultravisor (a hardware-enforced firmware layer) manages encrypted page tables so that even a compromised hypervisor cannot access guest memory.

  • Uses Customer Communication Key (CCK) derived from a hardware Unique Card Key (UCK) fused at manufacturing

  • AES-256 XTS memory encryption, unique per-guest key

  • Secure Boot: Guest image signed with IBM’s key; host cannot boot an unsigned guest

  • Widely deployed in banking and healthcare (z16 processes 70% of global transaction value)

37.6 FPGA Implementation: Confidential Computing Accelerators

Component FPGA Platform Resources Notes
AES-XTS-256 MEE Xilinx Alveo U280 3,200 LUTs, 4 BRAMs 10 GB/s throughput
RMP Table Walker AMD EPYC emulation (UltraScale+) 8,500 LUTs Reverse Map Table prototype
TDX SEAM Module Intel Agilex 7 45,000 LUTs Research prototype, Intel Labs 2023
CCA RMM Prototype Neoverse N2 FPGA model 12,000 LUTs ARM Cambridge Research
Attestation Quote Gen Xilinx Artix-7 6,800 LUTs, 1 DSP 200 MHz, ECDSA-P256

37.7 ASIC Implementation Data

Product Process MEE Area Throughput TDP
Intel Sapphire Rapids (TDX) Intel 7 (10nm ESF) \(\sim\)15 mm2 400 GB/s 350 W
AMD EPYC Genoa (SEV-SNP) TSMC 5nm \(\sim\)12 mm2 460 GB/s 360 W
ARM Cortex-A720 (CCA) TSMC 4nm \(<\)1 mm2 51 GB/s 3 W
IBM z16 Ultravisor IBM 5nm Integrated 32 TB/s (system) 20 kW
NVIDIA H100 HBM3 MEE TSMC 4N \(\sim\)8 mm2 3.35 TB/s 700 W

37.8 Confidential Computing Ecosystem

Solution Vendor Description
TDX + DCAP Intel TDX-enabled Xeon; DCAP attestation library (open source)
SEV-SNP AMD EPYC Milan/Genoa; snp-guest driver in Linux 5.19+
CCA / TF-RMM ARM Neoverse N3/V3 platform; TF-RMM open source
Secure Execution IBM z15/z16 LinuxONE; KVM host
Confidential Containers CNCF kata-containers + CC backends (TDX/SEV/CCA)
Azure CVM Microsoft AMD SEV-SNP and TDX; vTPM 2.0
AWS Nitro Enclaves Amazon Nitro security chip; isolated EC2 enclaves
GCP Confidential VMs Google AMD SEV-SNP; Shielded VM
Enarx Enarx Project Cross-platform CC runtime (TDX/SEV/SGX)
Gramine Gramine Project Library OS for SGX/TDX app shielding
Veraison Linux Foundation Attestation verification service (RATS)

37.9 Recent Developments (2024–2026)

37.9.1 Confidential AI: TEE + GPU Convergence

The convergence of Confidential Computing with AI accelerators is a defining trend of 2024–2025:

  • NVIDIA H100 Confidential Computing (GA 2023): AES-XTS-256 HBM3 memory encryption, PCIe TDX/SEV-SNP attestation. H200 (2024) extends with HBM3e 141 GB/s bandwidth encryption.

  • AMD MI300X + SEV-SNP (2024): GPU and CPU memory encryption unified, enabling confidential LLM inference.

  • Intel Gaudi 3 Confidential AI (2024): ECDSA attestation of HPU, AES-256 HBM encryption.

Tip: Confidential AI workloads require end-to-end confidentiality: CPU memory (SEV-SNP/TDX), GPU memory (H100 CC), the PCIe link (IDE – PCIe Integrity and Data Encryption), and the attestation chain must all be verified before running a confidential model.

37.9.2 CCA Deployment in Mobile and Edge

ARM CCA silicon shipped in:

  • Qualcomm Snapdragon 8 Gen 3 (2023): First mobile SoC with RME

  • MediaTek Dimensity 9300 (2023): CCA-capable

  • Samsung Exynos 2400 (2024): CCA with Samsung Knox integration

Use cases: private ML inference on-device, digital identity (eIDAS 2.0 EUDIW credentials in Realm), mobile payments.

37.9.3 TEE-I/O: Confidential Peripherals

PCIe IDE (Integrity and Data Encryption, PCIe 6.0 spec) enables a TDX or SEV-SNP VM to establish an encrypted, authenticated channel directly to a PCIe device (NIC, NVMe SSD, GPU), bypassing the hypervisor:

  • SPDM 1.3 (DMTF, 2023): device identity and measurement protocol used to authenticate PCIe devices before granting them access to a TD

  • Intel TDX Connect (2024): production deployment of TDX + PCIe IDE

  • CXL 3.0 Security: trusted memory pooling with integrity checks

Exercises

  1. Explain the difference between a process-level TEE (Chapter 4) and a VM-level confidential computing environment like TDX or SEV-SNP. What is the TCB for each?

  2. AMD SEV-SNP uses a Reverse Map Table (RMP). Explain how the RMP prevents a hypervisor from injecting data into a guest VM. What fault is raised on violation?

  3. In ARM CCA, what is the role of the Root world? Why is EL3 (Monitor) placed in Root rather than Secure world?

  4. A cloud customer wants to run a confidential ML inference workload. List all the hardware security components required end-to-end (CPU, GPU, interconnect, attestation).

  5. Describe the DCAP attestation flow for Intel TDX. What is the PCCS and why is it needed?

  6. CacheWarp (2023) exploited AMD SEV’s cache behaviour to revert encrypted memory to a stale state. Explain the mechanism and why the fix required a microcode update.

  7. Compare the throughput-to-security trade-offs of AES-XTS-128 vs AES-XTS-256 in a memory encryption engine operating at DDR5-6400 bandwidth (\(\sim\)51 GB/s).